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Russia

Profile last written 2026-08-11, latest processed report 2026-10-25. A partial refresh updates this timestamp for the whole profile, so individual assessments may be older.

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Russia has been waging a full-scale war of invasion against Ukraine since February 2022, heavily burdening the economy and society, without the Kremlin having undertaken a total mobilization following the model of the "Great Patriotic War" - a status quo war with high costs (according to the Dutch military intelligence service ~1,2 million euros). Losses since 2022, of which >500,000 deaths), in which Russia continued to expand its armed forces in 2025, despite the losses. As of August 2026: The Kremlin officially continues to DEMENTIATE any new general mobilization ('unnecessary', Federation Council member Klishas; 'pre-election propaganda' allegation against mobilization rumours, Medw) and instead relies on contract recruitment with high entry fees - but the recruiting rate for contract soldiers has been traceable since the end of 2025, according to independent exile media (Verstka, Vazhnyye Istorii), with units occupied at only 30-40% in part. The US Institute ISW evaluates a new wave of mobilization as a 'personal decision for Putin', away from the frontline and Kremlin stability perception - not as decided, but as a growing option. Negotiating signals (Putin) and continuing hostilities exist side by side.

Strategic interests

  • Kontrolle über die Ukraine als außenpolitisches Kernziel (laut lettischem Verfassungsschutz unverändert)
  • Verhinderung weiterer NATO-Osterweiterung / Zurückdrängen der europäischen Sicherheitsarchitektur
  • Deepening the partnership with China (>90% of sanctioned technology imports come from China; Energy Cooperation Power of Siberia 2)
  • Ausbau von Partnerschaften außerhalb des Westens (Indien via RELOS-Pakt, Iran) zur Umgehung von Isolation

Alliance pattern

There is no formal deviation in the sense of NATO. In contrast to China, Iran and India: a network of asymmetrical, pragmatic partnerships with no obligation to assist each other - not explicitly referred to as an alliance, not even by the actors involved themselves ('not an alliance but a flexible strategic partnership' - Bobo Lo to China; 'strategic partners, not allies' - Hanna Notte to Iran). In the story of China, increasingly asymmetrical to Russia's disadvantages. North Korea has been supplying substantial combat troops since 2024 (up to 15,000 in Kursk 2024/25; President Zelenskyy declared in July 2026 that Russia wants 30,000 more North Korean troops - Reuters can't fully verify), artillery, millions of munitions, and since August 2026 its own missile unit with ballistic weapons in the fight against Ukraine - according to Pyongyang's defense news 'most significant involvement in a war since the 1950s'. This substance has now been acquired by the Iranian subsidiary after expert opinion (Hanna Notte, p. leverage_points). Formally, this too remains a bilateral treaty (June 2024, 'comprehensive strategic partnership' with mutual assistance clause in case of 'external aggression') without a public NATO analogy - but the TATSAECHLIC assistance (combat forces) differs qualitatively from the partnerships with China/Iran/India.

Historical traumas

  • The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 as the deepest spiritual disorientation - ground for authoritarian consolidation/putinism that provides concrete, self-confident answers to the open questions of the 1990s
  • The Ukrainian war is framed in the Russian State Discourse as the "Great Patriotic War" (WWII) - a framework which, according to a thorough analysis, is not really suitable for Russia itself (unlike for Ukraine) because there is no full mobilization.

Ideological boundaries

  • Ablehnung 'liberaler' Verfassungsauslegung zugunsten von 'Staatlichkeit' (gosudarstvennost) und traditionellen Werten, inkl. religiöser Legitimation (islamische Rechtstradition als Stütze 'traditioneller Werte')
  • A sharp anti-Western/anti-colonial rhetoric at the government level (Medvedev: Western sanctions as piracy', demand for the rejection of 'colonialism as a crime against humanity)
  • Internally, pluralism is treated as a threat 'systemic opposition' (KPRF) is managed, not eradicated, but structurally limited; repression against dissidents (Case Navalny) has intensified since 2022
  • Gezielt patriotisch-militarisierte Ausrichtung der Kindererziehung seit 2022 ('Important Conversations'-Pflichtstunden)

Predictability

low

Recent record

AI-generated profile — written by a language model from public news reporting about a public figure or institution. It is a reading, not a statement of fact, and it can lag current events; the record above is date-stamped per item.