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Russia

Profile last written 2026-08-11, latest processed report 2026-09-13. A partial refresh updates this timestamp for the whole profile, so individual assessments may be older.

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Russia has been waging a full-scale war of invasion against Ukraine since February 2022, heavily burdening the economy and society, without the Kremlin undertaking a total mobilization following the model of the "Great Patriotic War" - a high-cost status quo war (according to the Dutch military intelligence service ~1.2 million casualties since 2022, of which >500,000 died) in which Russia continued to expand its fighting through 2025 despite the losses. As of August 2026, the Kreml DEMENTIERT officially continues to declare any new general mobilization ('unnecessary', a member of the Federation Council Klishas; 'true-proposed' but accused of mobile mobilisation, but occupying the hands of the Dutch media) as a top-down decision to abstain from the front lines of negotiations with the US military, but only after the end of the war, according to the Russian Foreign Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Putin) - a 30 to 40 per cent war against the US.

Strategic interests

  • Kontrolle über die Ukraine als außenpolitisches Kernziel (laut lettischem Verfassungsschutz unverändert)
  • Verhinderung weiterer NATO-Osterweiterung / Zurückdrängen der europäischen Sicherheitsarchitektur
  • Deepening the partnership with China (>90% of sanctioned technology imports come from China; Energy Cooperation Power of Siberia 2)
  • Ausbau von Partnerschaften außerhalb des Westens (Indien via RELOS-Pakt, Iran) zur Umgehung von Isolation

Alliance pattern

In contrast to China, Iran and India, there is an increasingly asymmetrical network of pragmatic partnerships with no obligation to provide mutual assistance - not explicitly referred to as an alliance, not by the actors involved themselves ('not an alliance but a flexible strategic partnership' - Bobo Lo to China; 'strategic partners, not allies' - Hanna notes to Iran). In dealing with China, an increasing asynchronous relationship with Russia's disadvantage.

Historical traumas

  • The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 as the deepest spiritual disorientation - ground for authoritarian consolidation/putinism that provides concrete, self-confident answers to the open questions of the 1990s
  • The Ukrainian war is framed in the Russian State Discourse as the "Great Patriotic War" (WWII) - a framework which, according to a thorough analysis, is not really suitable for Russia itself (unlike for Ukraine) because there is no full mobilization.

Ideological boundaries

  • Ablehnung 'liberaler' Verfassungsauslegung zugunsten von 'Staatlichkeit' (gosudarstvennost) und traditionellen Werten, inkl. religiöser Legitimation (islamische Rechtstradition als Stütze 'traditioneller Werte')
  • A sharp anti-Western/anti-colonial rhetoric at the government level (Medvedev: Western sanctions as piracy', demand for the rejection of 'colonialism as a crime against humanity)
  • Internally, pluralism is treated as a threat 'systemic opposition' (KPRF) is managed, not eradicated, but structurally limited; repression against dissidents (Case Navalny) has intensified since 2022
  • Gezielt patriotisch-militarisierte Ausrichtung der Kindererziehung seit 2022 ('Important Conversations'-Pflichtstunden)

Predictability

low

Recent record

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